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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D., MONTANA)

TID!: 2ND GERMAN CRISIS
Mr. President:
In recent weeks, two serious incidents have taken place in connection
with Berlin.

They reveal once again, with stark clarity, the potentiality of

conflict which is inherent in that situation.

The first incident was that of

the Allied military plan to fly planes above the 10, 000
lanes to Berlin.

The second involved an attempt of

~oot

commu~ist

l3vel on the airborder guards to

switch the passes of allied personnel traveling the land routes to Berlin.

Had

the switch worked, allied personnel would have been compelled to acknowledge
the authority of the East German regime in place of the Soviet Union over the
approaches from the West.

Hence, the Russians would have been in a position

to absolve themselves from responsibility for subsequent interference with
allied passage to Berlin.

T~is

second incident led to a prompt reprisal against

the movement of Soviet personnel in viestern Germany.
These incidents, each in its own way, represented the placing of the
chip on the shoulder.

They were the dares of children carried over into the

deadly game of devastating military confrontation.
Fortunately, the interaction of
a halt before it had gone very far.

reprisal--counter-rep~isal--came

to

Fortunately, the chips were removed from

the shoulders by those who had placed them there instead of being sent flying
at some point by one side or the other.

That these incidents did not lead to

serious consequences may well have been due solely to the intervention of the
highest political authorities, President Eisenhower in one instance and Mr.
Khrushchev in the other.
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In this fashion is the way to the summit kept openo but--let us not
delude ourselves--the way of almost haphazard descent into disaster is not
closed.

It is avoided for the moment but it is not closed.

Nor will it be

closed so long as the problems of a divided Berlin, encased as they are in
the problems of a divided Germany and the still larger problems of a divided
Europe are not faced, so long as they are not faced with policies which fit
today's realities rather than with yesterday's generalities.
What are these antiquated generalities on Gerwany,
to which all involved appear still to cling?
eralities are these:

~x.

President,

On the Soviet sice, the gen-

In some fashion, at some time, all of Germany will become

a communist state if only the Western presence can be removed from Berlin and
the two parts of Germany kept sharply separated for the indefinite future.
And the generalities on the part of the Western allies?

Our poli-

cies hold that at some time, in some fashion, all of Germany will be drawn
into the Western camp if

on~y

the allied presence remains in Berlin and if

we can will out of existence that half of Germany which is held by the communists until such time as it can become a part of and subject to the political
control of a united Germany.
There are certain similarities, Mr. President, in the two positions.
In communist policies, no less than in those of the Western allies, great
significance is attached to control of Berlin.

Further, both positions tacitly

regard the present division of Germany as preferable to the alternatives to
unity which have so far been proffered.

And, apparently, at least the highest

political leadership on each side is fully cognizant of the catastrophic consequences of total military conflict in present circumstances and seeks, therefore, to avoid its use in the pursuit of political objectives in Germany.
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If these are the

generalitie~what

are the re&lities?

The over-

rjding reality is that there are two German authorities in one Germany and
there is no indication whatsoever that either is going to go away in peace.
The present division is maintained, on one side, by a German authority with
a high degree of public support and popular participation, by the presecce
of allied forces in Berlin, by the symbol of NATO's protection.

It is main-

tained, on the other side, by a very low degree of public support propped up
with totalitarian controls, backed by Soviet armed forces and such guarantees
as are contained in the Connnunist Warsaw pact.

In short, the division of

Germany into two poli tic~:~,l entities erlsts whether it is recognized or not.
In these circumstances, I see no likelihood that the generalities
of Soviet policy on Germany lead anywhere but in circles endlessly travelled.
Nor do I see--in present circumstances--that Western generalities lead anywhere but in circles endlessly travelled.

That has certainly been the ex-

perience of the past decade and a half.
In short, Mr. President, as between the \'/estern allies and the
Soviet bloc there is stalemate in Germany.
in peace.

There will be no vi estern retreat

Nor do I see the probability of a Soviet withdrawal in peace.

We

may be able to maintain the situation without total war--at Berlin no less
than in Germany as a whole--if we are prepared to pay the price.

The Com-

munists can maintain it, too, and even challenge it at Berlin if they are
prepared to pay the price.
The

~uestion

for us, no less than for them, is not:

situation be maintained?

Rather, it is:

Can the present

Do we want to maintain it?

situation in the highest interests of the Western nations?
truth, in the highest interests of the Soviet people?

Is this

Is it, in all

Is there an alternative

which better serves these highest interests on both sides?
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The need for an alternative is indicated, I believe, by historic
experience.

German unification will not wait forever.

At some point the

Germans themselves will tire of the present disunity 1·Thich is imposed upon
them largely by the ideological differences of the Western nations and the
Soviet Union.

If the mood of a plague on both your houses sweeps through

that country it may well upset the delicate balance upon which the peace of
Europe and the world is now hinged.

For that reason, alone, Mr. President,

we must seek, even as the Russians must seek, in a

mut~al

interest in the

survival of a recognizable civilization, 1·re must seek a 1·ray to end the present
stalemate.

It is too great a risk for mankind--for the Russians no less than

the Western nations--to assume an

indefi~ite

German acquiescence in the present

division.
We need, further, Mr. President, to devise a new situation at Berlin,
not for West Berlin alone, as the Russians would have it, but for all Berlin.
For, it is at that point that the intimate juxtaposition of opposing military
forces creates the gravest danger of careless or accidental sparks which may
go beyond the control of those who play with the fire.

This point is under-

scored by the incidents to which I referred at the beginning of my remarks
and by others of a similar nature going back to the time of the Berlin Blockade.

The point of no return has not yet been transgressed in these incidents

but let no one assume that, with the hair-triggering of modern military
establishments, that point will continue indefinitely to be avoided.
Finally, Mr. President, some way other than stalemate in Germany
is essential, if the huge burden of armaments is not to grow beyond the
capacities of all peoples to bear.

Certainly it is essential if we no less

than the Russians mean seriously to lighten this burden.

We may well ask
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ourselves:

How much of our annual military budget of

occasioned by this stalemate?

$L~O

or more billions is

Hovr much of the budgets of the Russians, the

British, the French, indeed, the budgets of just about every nation in Europe?
We are correct when we stand firm in the face of a Soviet provocation at Berlin.

But standing firm, alone, meets only the immediate provocation .

It does not face these other factors in the German situation, the factors which
strongly indicate that the present stalemate is not adequate .

Standing firm,

alone, does not meet the question of the essential need for peaceful progress
on German unification.

Standing firm, alone, does not meet the question of

the danger of accidental war or war by child-like provocation at Berlin.

Stand-

ing firm, alone, does not meet the question of the inter-relationship between
a dangerously divided Germany and a dangerously divided Europe--the delicate
balance between peace and war.

Hence, it does not meet the question--let

alone of disarmament--but even of the capacity of the nations involved to bear
the burden of armaments, along with all the other burdens of an increasingly
complex civilization.
We may believe that we are countering the immediate provocation,
but we do not face these essential questions by proposing to hold plebiscites
in Western Berlin on the eve of a summit conference, especially plebiscites
whose results are a foregone conclusion.

In election after election--the

most recent in December 1959--the people of Berlin have made clear beyond any
doubt that when faced with a choice between freedom and communist absorption,
they will choose overwhelmingly, for freedom, even freedom on the razor's
edge.

I can see no virtue in a parade of West Berliners to the polls once

again to prove what has been
of Soviet acknowledgment.

proven~

over and over again, even to the point

I can see harm in it, particularly in a world

- 6 that has had a surfeit of propaganda in recent years.
may hammer home more firmly the existing stalemat e.

A gesture of that kind
It does not face the

questions which suggest that it is time to end the stalemate.
Nor are these questions faced by Mr. Khrushchev when he se'e ks to
alter the status of West Berlin alone.

To be sure the situation in \-lest

Berlin may be "abnormal" as the President and Mr. Khrushchev apparently have
agreed.

But one does not achieve normalcy by compounding the abnormality.

If the situatlon in West Berlin is abnormal now, it would be even more abnormal
to substitute for it the situation which
would leave as the sole

Germ~n

~x.

Khrushchev

h~s

proposed.

For, he

authority in what will one day be again the

capital of all Germany, a militant minority, the German communist reg:l.me of
east Germany.

He would leave, in this fashion, the symbolic citadel of German

unification in the hands of those with the least claim to it.

As for the

international enclave of freedom, which would remain in West Berlin, it would
matter little vrhether its safety were guaranteed or not.
German authority in Berlin, their

capita~

It would be to the

not to a sleepy international enclave,

to which more and more Germans vould look for leadership and inspiration.
Nor are the questions faced on our part by a continued advocacy
of free all German elections.

Communism will not write its death warrant

in East Germany in this fashion, not when it is holding the gun.

We may call

for free elections and, indeed, we should; but let us not delude ourselves
into believing that this will bring about unification or in any way act to
end the present stalemate.

We have called ourselves hoarse on this point

for a decade and a half and so far as anyone can see, the German totalitarian
regime in the East has used this time to drive the stakes of possession more
firmly into the ground.
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fa~ed

by the Russians, Mr.

President, when they call for formal recognition of t he division of Germany
and certification of the division in peace treaties vith two Geroo.nies.

How

many wars need to be fought before it is perceived, at laat, that a numerous
and determined people once seized with the sense of national unity are not
likely to be kept forever apart in peace?

Countless forgotten agreements

which have presumed to make permanent by paper such cleavages gather dust in
the archives of history.
What I am suggesting,

~x.

President, is that if there is to be

reasonable hope for peace, there must be reasonable hope soon for the reunification of Germany.

The absence of such hope may very well convert the

rational urge to national unity into the irrational ur.ge fo:!:' conquest and,
in this connection, it is significant to note that a substantial body of
Germans already identify East Germany as Middle Germany and look to the lands
beyond the Oder-Neisse as the true East.

It is not far-fetched to assume that

the patterns of the past may repeat themselves, in modern garb, in circumstances provided by the continued German cleavage, by the deep divisions in
Europe, by a world which hangs continually by fingertips from the sill of
incipient disaster.
The pressures of the German situation are little different, today,
from what they were, when a year ago, their prolonged neglect, led to the
first German crisis.

That they did not erupt, then, was due to the round of

goodwill tours, the visiting back and forth and hitlEr and yon.
longer these safety valves will operate, it is difficult to say.

How much
Hhat can

be said With certainty is that it is unsafe to rely indefinitely on safety
valves.

- 8 Sooner or later the nations involved must come to grips with the
realities of the German situation as it is today.

It is probable that the

longer the moment of reckoning is put off, the smaller will be the margin
for peace, a durable peace.
If the pressures in the German situation are the same as they were
a year ago, it seems to me that the means with which they might be dealt in
peace are also similar to those which were indicated then.

At that time , the

Senate will recall that I advanced for discussion 9 essentials upon which a
firm western policy for peace might conceivably be built.

It is among these

points, I believe, in which we may still find the way to solution.
As then, so now, the focal point of potential conflict is Berlin,
where the military confrontation is most intimate and unsta1:il. e.

As then ,

so now, the answer to this problem does not lie in propaganda stances or
gestures ; nor does it lie in the incantation of the words of firmness while
the first of the deferred payments of appeasing concession is made for the
dubious privilege of maintaining the existing stalemate.

Nor does it lie

in the astute proposal of Mr. Khrushchev to alter the status of West Berlin
alone, even if the guarantees which he proffers for that altered status were
absolute.
The answer, the answer for peace, it seems to me, lies in a change
of status for all Berlin, for East Berlin no less than vlest Berlin.

The

answer, it seems to me, lies in agreement which permits this city--this entire city--and its routes of access to be held in trust by the United Nations
or some other international body, with neutral forces responsible to its
authority, until such time as it is once again the capital of all Germany.
Le~

this new interim status for the entire city be guaranteed by the Allied
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nations . by the communist nations, by the United
maintaining the city

i~

ITa~ :.ons.

Let the cost of

trust be borne by the two principle

Ge~~n

political

authorities which have the greatest stake in it--by Bonn and Pankow--in proportions equal to the authority which they claim.

Beneath an international

authority, let the two German authorities begin the long and difficult task
of merging the two parts of what is one city.
In a setting of that kind, Mr. President, we might contemplate t.he beginning
of the end of the present dangerous juxtaposition of Soviet and Allied forces.
~Te

might find as valid the withdrawal of both Soviet and Allied forces from

Berlin.
In the microcosm of Berlin, moreover, could be cast the molds of reunification
for all of Germany.

I thiwt it is clear that that reunification is not going

to begin on the basis of free all-German elections in the foreseeable future.
Nor does the formula offered by the Russians offer any greater hope, for they
would formalize the division of Germany into two German nations, 'vith a vague
provision for future negotiations between these two nations on the question
of unification.
If there is to be a well-founded hope for German reunification in peace, it
must be recognized by all that we are dealing with one German nation in which
there are two German political entities.

I say that, Mr. President, not to

play with words but in an effort to define more precisely the reality which
confronts us, for it is only in terms of that reality that we can hope to act
for peace in Germany.
To divide Germany into two nations, as the Russians suggest, will not change
the fact that there is one Germany.

It may postpone the day when that unity

will reassert itself but it will also increase the violence of the pressure
for unification and may well thrust that pressure from rational into irrational
channels.
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Similarly to insist upon free all-German elections at this time , as the route
to unification, is also to postpone the day of unification, in all probability;
with the same

conseg~ences.

This route, unfortunately, is closed by the ines-

capable fact that there are two political entities in the one Germany.

While

one entity might achieve supremacy by this route, the other is not likely to
conduct its own burial in peace by this route.
If these are the facts, as I believe them to be, and if it is desirable to
break the stalemate now in Germany, as I believe it to be, then it follows
that there should be one peace treaty with Germany, with both German political
entities sharing responsibility for it.

It follows that both, with such assist-

ance and persuasion as can be provided from without, must assume deep responsibilities in the task of unification because that task will be most difficult,;)
in the lapse of 15 years, institutions have grown up in the two parts of Germany which will not readily be reconciled, one with the other.

It follows ) too,

that if there cannot be free all-German elections at this time , there must be
at least a guaranteed measure of equal political freedom and of equal political
participation for all Germans, living in each of the two political entities
at this time.
Finally, to act for peace, not only in Germany but in all Europe and to give
substance to the professed universal desire for a lightening of the burden of
armaments, there must be recognition on all sides that present military arrangements in Germany and, in deed, in all Europe are not sacrosanct.

If there is

an end to the military confrontation at Berlin, if there is visible progress
in peace towards German unification, then there can be, there ought to be, a
general easement of the entire European military confrontation and the development of all-European agreements for safeguarding the peace.

The Eden, the

Rapacki and similar proposals of the past warrant the most careful consideration
in this connection.
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Mr. President, what I suggasted in February, 1959, and vmat I say today, seems
to me to encompass the essential elements of a new Western approach to the problems of Germany and Europe.

If one holds that the present stalemate is greatly

in our interest then I suppose there is little point in considering these elements.

If one holds, as I hold, that the present stalemate is not in our highest

interest and if we are to have a chance to avoid both the pitfalls of appeasement and conflict in the days, months and years ahead, then these elements of
a new policy, I believe, are worthy of the most careful and continuous consideration.
During the past year, I believe they have received such consideration in this
country and elsewhere .

It seems to me that Western policy, particularly as

m8nifested at the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers last spring, reflects
a movement away from the generalities of yesterday towards the realities of
today.

I hope that vlestern policy in the period ahead will reflect the views

of all the Allied nations, but the domination of no single nation and, in so
doing, will continue the process of transition to new tenets.
There is no assurance that this transition will bring about the settlement
which Europe and the world needs.

There is no assurance that a similar and

essential transition will take place in Soviet policies and without it, there
will be no agreement.

But whatever the Soviet reaction, this transition in our

own policies needs to continue in the highest Western interests and in the interests of mankind.
vle

cannot ignore our own responsibilities on the assumption that others will

ignore theirs.
neglect.

'·le cannot, for we shall suffer along with others, for our own

There is no escape.

There is no retreat.

hope that others will do the same.

He must seek a change and

But we must not avoid a change if it is in

our interests, regardless of what others may do or not do.

We must seek, in new
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policies, an agreement which eases rather than appeases at Berlin, an agreement
which paves a practical way to the peaceful

unifi~ati0n

of Germany, an agreement

which begins to stitch the cleavage between Europe--East and West.

Let others

obstruct such en agreement if they will but let us not ignore these needs in our
policies, these needs which are the most compelling that confront the people of
the Hestern

~·lorld--the

people of Russia and Eastern Europe no less than those

of vJestern Europe and the United States.

